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Introduction
Credit unions exist to provide their members financial services that are also offered by other financial institutions, namely, banks, thrifts institutions and finance companies, among others. From McKillop and Wilson (2011) , credit unions are self-help cooperative financial organizations geared to attaining the economic and social goals of members and wider local communities. The credit union is governed by its members, members elect (from within that membership), unpaid volunteer, paid officers and directors, who establish the policies under which the credit union operates.
For their members to continue to do business with them requires credit unions' financial services to be provided at lower cost than other financial institutions. In the absence of this, the member-owners of these credit unions would see no reason to patronize the credit union. The effect of this, of course, would be that the credit union would cease to exist as competing financial institutions would take over the markets they serve. However, other members join the credit unions for non-pecuniary reasons as noted by Smith (1984) . One way of achieving this survival objective is for credit unions' management to make efficient use of resources allotted to them by the owners of the union. In the credit union setting, business is conducted with owners and for owners. This presents a natural margin squeeze which calls for a good control over expenses if the value creation for the owners of the credit union is to stay intact (Taylor, 1977) .
The inability to control expenses might mean managers have to report declines in performance to owners. The manager of the credit union is therefore presented with a situation where they have to continuously work on improving efficiency both from within, technical efficiency, through their production process, and from without, cost efficiency (CE), a market space where banks pose a major threat.
Currently there exist 34 licensed banks, 4 licensed representative offices, 71 specialized depository institutions, 140 licensed rural and community banks, 417 licensed Forex Bureaux and over 435 licensed credit unions in Ghana. The current Ghanaian financial industry is particularly worrying as in July 2015, the central bank, Bank of Ghana (BoG) revoked the license of 70 microfinance companies and a money lending company. These institutions had their operations suspended because of inefficiencies. In the year 2017, two banks (UT Bank and Capital Bank) had their banking license withdrawn and the BoG declared them illiquid and deficient in capital.
In the midst of all these, the credit union sector of the financial institutions industry in Ghana has been relatively safe. This situation demands an inquiry into how resources are used in the credit union, should technical or cost should be made a priority by the management in the pursuit of overall efficiency in the credit union setting? This is the problem the paper attempts to explore.
This study sets to achieve a number of objectives. First, it aims to estimate and discuss the CE of credit unions using the non-parametric Tones' efficiency from data envelopment analysis (DEA) approach. Second, we estimate and discuss overall technical efficiency of the credit unions. Third, appraise the nature of relationship that exists between cost and technical efficiency. Finally, using regression analysis, we explain discretional and non-discretional factors, particularly banking sector development and how they relate to credit union efficiency. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses literature review, Section 3 discusses method, data, specification of input and outputs variables and Section 4 discusses results and discussion. Section 5 discusses conclusion and recommendations.
This paper contributes to the debate on cost and technical efficiency in a cooperative setting. We empirically assess the heterogeneous ability of credit unions in accessing input at different prices on efficiency. Our study also examines technical efficiency, an empirical gap yet to receive sufficient attention in the credit union literature. By including the banking sector development in our study, the impact of the "no boundary effects" in terms of conducting business with owners and non-owners in the case of banks especially on credit unions' efficiency is carefully examined. Furthermore, by focusing on Ghanaian credit union industry, we provide empirical evidence of the factors that drive efficiency from a frontier economy context and make some recommendations. Worthington (1998) showed that non-core commercial activities do not have a significant influence on the level of cost inefficiency although asset size, capital adequacy regulation, branch and agency networks are significantly associated with CE in Australian credit unions. In Worthington (1999) , a large number of credit unions in Australia were best-practice efficient, and any efficiency found appears to flow from x-inefficiencies. Worthington (2000) employed a two-stage procedure to evaluate non-bank financial institution CE and revealed that the major source of overall cost inefficiency appears to be allocative inefficiency rather than technical inefficiency. McKillop et al. (2002) examined relative efficiency of UK credit unions using radial and non-radial efficiency measures to investigate cost performance and revealed that credit unions have considerable scope for efficiency gains using both measures of efficiency. Esho's (2001) sample of Australian credit unions demonstrates that bond type, size, age, average deposit size and interest rate
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Technical efficiency spreads are significant determinants of relative CE from stochastic frontier and distribution-free methodology. Frame et al.'s (2003) work estimates a translog cost function for credit unions and mutual thrifts focusing on the unique objectives of mutually owned depository institutions and shows that credit unions with residential common bonds have higher costs than mutual thrifts; however, they noted that single common bond occupational and associational credit unions are more cost efficient. Using stochastic frontier analysis, McKillop et al. (2005) concluded that UK credit unions from the period 1999-2001 were subject to high levels of inefficiency and that the environment in which a credit union operates plays a vital role in relative efficiency, with large credit unions being more cost efficient. Battaglia et al. (2010) analyzed the impact of environmental factors on cost and profit efficiencies of cooperative banks including credit unions in Italy for the period 2000-2005. Cooperative banks in the Northeast of Italy are shown to be the more cost efficient, benefiting from a favorable environment. Wilcox and Dopico (2011) considered credit union mergers and efficiency, in situations where the acquirer is much larger than the target credit union, target members benefit in terms of lower loan rates and higher deposit rates, while acquirer members see little change as cost benefits are shared equally when the merging credit unions are equal in size. Wheelock and Wilson (2013) used an adapted version of the "order-a quantile" frontier estimate to compare larger and smaller size credit unions, and showed that small size credit unions confronted a shift in technology that increased the minimum cost required to produce given amounts of output and that all but the largest credit unions also became less scale efficient over time. Glass et al. (2014) demonstrated that Japanese cooperatives over the period 1998-2009 have secured both technical progress and a decrease in technical inefficiency. Wijesiri et al. (2015) provided evidence for credit unions from Sri Lanka on technical efficiency that age, type of the institution and return on assets are the crucial determinants of technical efficiency.
Methodology
The method for estimating efficiency is divided into two: the econometric (parametric) and the mathematical programming (non-parametric) approach. The distinction between the parametric methods and non-parametric methods is that the former assigns a density function to the stochastic component of the model, while the latter only defines the deterministic part. DEA is a non-parametric method introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) from the works of Farrell (1957) , which presents a mathematical linear programming-based technique for measuring relative efficiency of decision-making unit (DMU) that has multiple inputs and outputs. Originally developed for measuring the efficiency of not-for-profit, public sector enterprises, DEA has found widespread applications in the context of profit-oriented organizations.
DEA has several advantages: it is easy to use, it allows for multiple inputs and multiple outputs in a single framework, it does not require specification of functional form for the frontier, it does not require a priori specification of weights for inputs and outputs and, finally, inputs and outputs can be expressed in different measurement units. The weakness includes the assumption that the distance from the frontier is entirely due to inefficiency without considering random errors such as errors of measurement or unforeseen events impacting the DMU. Also, the technique is sensitive to outlier data. Further DEA does not measure "absolute" efficiency but relative efficiency and finally statistical hypothesis tests are difficult to conduct in the DEA method.
For the purpose of this study, we chose the non-parametric DEA technique to examine the CE of credit unions in Ghana using Tone's (2002) CE approach. Very few studies have, however, adopted Tone's (2002) cost efficiency model in banking more so in credit unions, or openly discussed it (Tone and Sahoo, 2005; Tone and Tsutsui, 2007; Dong et al., 2014) .
The original DEA by Charnes et al. (1978) which assumes constant returns to scale has been extended to the variable returns (VRS) (Banker et al., 1984) , profit maximization (Fried et al., 1993) and cost minimization (Färe and Grosskopf, 1985) . From Maudos et al. (2002) , CE is the ratio between the minimum cost at which it is possible to attain a given volume of production and the realized cost. From this definition, a DMU is cost efficient if it uses minimum level of cost as compared to the actual cost observed at the end of a production period. It is the product of allocative and technical efficiency (Fethi and Pasiouras, 2010) .
Technical efficiency refers to the ability to use the right resources appropriately. A DMU is technically efficient only when it uses the least amount of inputs to produce maximum outputs (Koopmans, 1951 cited in Fried et al., 1993 . The CE of observed credit unions is given by the distance of its detected cost point from a constructed cost frontier (Dong et al., 2014) . Thus, the CE of an evaluated credit union is modeled as follows:
where w iJ is a set of input prices for a vector of inputs i, for credit union J, x n iJ denotes the cost minimizing vector of inputs quantities for the credit union J under observation, x is input and x* is optimal inputs. The traditional CE DEA model by Färe et al. (1985a) assumed that input prices are the same across all DMUs, and though actual markets may function under imperfect competition, unit input prices may not be the same across all DMUs. Tone (2002) identified these drawbacks in the conventional CE DEA model and henceforth proposed a new scheme to measure CE. The new CE was further extended to the decomposition of CE by Tone and Tsutsui (2007) . Under the new CE model, DMUs with dissimilar input prices will provide different measures of CE (Dong et al., 2014) . The traditional (Färe et al., 1985a; Farrell, 1957) and new CE DEA (Tone, 2002) models are expressed in the following equations:
subject to:
l j y ri Ày ro X0 ; r ¼ 1; 2; . . .; s;
where x n jO denotes the cost minimizing vector of inputs quantities for the credit union under observation, given the vector of output weights y ro and input prices w jo . Hence, a hypothetical credit union with the same input price vector as the observed credit union j will have a CE score of w jO x n jO :
Technical efficiency subject to:
l j y rj Ày ro X0; r ¼ 1; 2; . . .; s;
where e∈R m a row vector with all elements equal to 1 and
The λ is the weights. The Tone (2002) cost model differs from the traditional model because under the latter, for observing the credit union unit cost of credit union j fixed at w io , we search for the optimal input mix x n O for producing y o . However, under the former the optimal input x n O that produces the output y o can be found independently of the credit union's prevailing unit price w O . Thus, based on the optimal solution (Tone, 2002) , CE T is defined as follows:
For technical efficiency θ TE , the input-oriented value-based framework is set up as follows:
subject to: P j¼J l j x o pyx io ; j ¼ 1; :::; m; X j¼J l j y rj Xy ro ; r ¼ 1; :::; s;
Inputs and outputs specification
In defining the inputs and outputs in financial institutions, the approaches used in literature include the intermediation approach, the production approach, the user cost approach and the value-added approach. We use the intermediation approach by considering financial institutions as intermediaries, converting and using factors of production paid for by owners to transfer financial saving from surplus units to deficit units in the form of loans. Three input variables are used by the credit union: Labor, Non-current asset and Deposits; the three outputs are: Loan, Liquid-financial investment and Non-loan income. The three input prices are Price of labor, Price of non-current asset and Price of funds. The cost of labor is proxied by personnel costs. The study would have benefitted from data on fulltime and part-time employees to be able to estimate an exact cost of labor; these were unavailable. Nonetheless, we believe that the current approach can serve as a good proxy for cost of labor.
Sample and data source
We sample firm-specific data from the annual financial report of 66 credit unions operating under the association of Credit Unions Association (CUA) of Ghana for the period 2008-2014. The panel data set permits us to control for variables like differences in business practices across the sampled credit unions which account for firm-specific heterogeneity. Banking industry indicators are sourced from Global Finance Development database, real Treasury bill rate calculated from data provided by the BoG and GDP growth rate from the World Development Indicators.
Econometric estimation
In examining the factors that could influence credit union efficiency, we adopt the two-stage semi-parametric process. In the first stage, we estimated cost and technical efficiency scores for all credit unions in our sample as specified in Equations (4) and (5). We follow Mercieca et al. (2007) by constructing a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) measure for each credit union to account for income diversification from non-loan income activities. We construct a combined non-loan income diversification index which measures the income generated from all non-loan income activities of the credit union. This is given as follows:
HHI (COMB) is diversification index for combined non-loan income. LFI is liquid-financial income, OFI is other liquid-financial income and ENT is one-time entrance fees charged new members. COM is commission income, OTI is other non-interest income and TNLNI is total non-loan income. An increasing HHI (COMB) implies the credit union is concentrating on one type of non-loan income focusing less on other non-loan income generating activity. The credit union Z-score (ZSCOR) captures financial stability, higher financial performance and capitalization implies stability. The Z-score measure is given as follows:
In the second stage, the efficiency estimates obtained from Equations (4) and (5) are regressed on the selected internal and external variables as specified in Equation (8) using mixed-effects and a two-limit Tobit regression method. We estimate the following panel regression model:
Banking Industry i;t þb 3 X 2 n¼1
Macro t þe i;t ;
where θ i,t is the estimated CE and technical efficiency derived from the input-oriented VRS Tone DEA, CU Factors is a vector of credit union specific characteristics, where Banking Industry is a set of banking industry condition and Macro is a set of macroeconomics variables as presented in Table I , ε i,t is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent individual credit union and time period, respectively. The use of the mixed-effects allows for inference on populations but not on individual credit union. Again mixed effect models credit union change across time. Finally, mixed effect model permits repeated observations
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Technical efficiency within individual credit unions types (community, workplace and society). We also use a two-limit Tobit regression because the cost and technical efficiency estimates are censored lower and upper values and no estimates fall outside this range. The usage of the Tobit model uses all of the information, that is censored, and leads to consistent estimates. In using these regression methods, the embedded maximum likelihood treats the correlation challenge asymptotically albeit at a measured rate. The credit union firm-specific factors are size captured by natural log of total asset, where LOTA is loan-to-asset ratio and LITA is liquidity (see McKillop et al., 2002) . We use BDLN to capture loan quality similar to Worthington (2000) . Instead of using non-interest income to total revenue as Worthington did, we capture income diversification using HHI (COMB) and this we believe gives us a good measure of income from non-loan activities. Age is used to capture the years of existence of a credit union (see Esho, 2001) . NWTA is net worth to total asset, a measure of equity holder's contribution. Z-score captures solvency risk; NIETA is the net interest expense to total asset, used to measure management control expenses.
For the external variables, we employ the following in our regression. BKCN5 (concentration ratio of the five largest banks in terms of asset) is to measure banking sector concentration, BKZS is Bank Z-score (banking industry stability), and BOCTA is bank overhead cost to total asset, a measure of banking sector efficiency. We also introduce GDP (growth in gross domestic products), to control for cyclical output effects, and RLTB (nominal one-year Treasury bill rate adjusted for inflation), to control for monetary policy stance.
The descriptive statistics in Table II reveal that during 2008-2014 some credit unions in Ghana were cost efficient scoring 1, with laggards scoring CE of 0.1078 with a mean value of 0.3888. For technical efficiency, best performing credit unions score 1, with an average efficiency score of 0.5439. On the average, most credit unions in Ghana were more technically efficient than cost efficient. The size of credit unions ranges from 17.3709 to 8.9551. The Z-score has the highest variability level of 38.6848, implying unstable solvency levels during the 2008-2014 period. The average net worth to total asset was 94.3705 percent. The highest bad loan recorded was 59.0278 percent. The NEITA ranged between 0.3810 and 39.7088. Loan scaled by total asset averaged 54.7368 percent. The longevity measure was from 1 year to 45 years of operations. Top 5 bank asset concentration ranged 55.71-87.32 during the period. Bank Z-score was 6.3229 on the average. Bank over cost to total asset was 55.5071 on the average with a mean real Treasury bill rate of 5.107.
From Table III , the mean loan granted over the seven-year sampled period was GH₵920,769.50 with a maximum loan of GH₵22,500,000. Liquid investment ranged between GH₵832.34 and GH₵7,560,580. Non-financial income had a variability of GH₵38,903.09, and the highest output of non-financial income is GH₵324,865.10. The input section of Table IV 
Cost efficiency analysis
From Table IV , we measure overall improvement in the efficiency over the seven years using the geometric mean because it is less influenced by very small or large values in skewed data. The CE overall shows that few credit unions recorded more than 50 percent CE during the sample period. The top 5 most efficient credit unions during the period 2008-2014 were Abosom, UG, DunkwaTrd, KAMCCU and Dunkwa Area Tea with efficiency scores of 83.8, 81.3, 73.6, 72.9 and 66.6 percent, respectively. These credit unions also recorded geometric mean CE as follows: Absomo, UG, DunkwaTrd, KAMCCU and Dunkwa Area Tea 80.9, 78.9, 67, 71.9 and 57.5 percent, respectively.
The worst performers in CE were Alu works, UGARS, Uni of Edu, NAFTI and St Maggi with score of 23.5, 12.5, 20.2, 18.6 and 13.7 percent, respectively. On the other hand, Alu recorded 23.4 percent, UGARS 20.3 percent, Uni of Edu 20 percent, NAFTI 18.5 percent and St Maggi 13.6 percent geometric mean in CE. On the whole, CE has ranged between 33 and 44 percent, with an average score of 38.9 percent and with a geometric mean of 36.4 percent. From this, we conclude that CE for credit unions is generally very low, implying production costs for most credit unions are very high.
Technical efficiency analysis
From Table V, the most technically efficient credit union over the period was GRA at 97.1 percent followed by Asawinso 95. On the whole, the average technical efficiency ranged between 50.5 and 59.7 percent with an average of 54.4 percent. There has been more variation in technical efficiency as seen in the standard deviation ranging from 21.7 to 27.4 percent with an average of 19.4 percent. The overall geometric mean in technical efficiency is 52.1 percent. We can see from the technical efficiency scores that resources are being used more efficiently in credit unions, thereby avoiding a lot of waste. Table V. 6. Comparing cost efficiency and technical efficiency; which one should be pursued first? For brevity, we analyze the performance of the top 3 credit unions, comparing their cost and technical efficiency scores, with the bottom 3 credit unions' technical and CE score in Tables IV and V, to verify if technical efficiency translates into cost technical efficiency.
Abosom ranked first with a score of 83.8 percent CE but was ranked 8th in technical efficiency with even higher score of 84.9 percent. Similarly, the second ranked cost efficient credit union, UG, with a score of 81.3 percent ranked 7th under technical efficiency with a score of 86.6 percent. The 3rd ranked cost efficient credit union, DunkwaTrd, with a score of 73.6 percent, ranked 13th under technical efficiency with score of 71 percent.
The worst ranked 63rd technical efficient credit union, Uni of Edu, with a score of 21.1 percent, was ranked 56th under CE with a score of 20.2 percent. The next worst ranked credit union under technical efficiency was UG Med, 62nd with a score of 24.4 percent, it ranked 32nd under CE with a score of 33.5 percent. Finally, the 61st ranked credit union based on technical efficiency, Kadjebi Tea, scored 25 percent and ranked 44th on CE with a score of 28.5 percent. We can conclude from this analysis that technical efficiency does not necessarily translate into CE. We are of the opinion that pursuing technical efficiency, an internal production process, should lead the charge over CE, a technique that requires prices which the credit union has to compete for in the open market.
The CE estimates show direct and significant relations with the size of the credit union. Table VI suggests that increasing the size of the credit union would improve CE in all the four models. The inference here is that bigger-sized credit union is more cost efficient than small-sized credit unions. This agrees with Esho (2001) that size is a significant determinant of credit union efficiency. Increasing provision for bad and doubtful debt infers that credit unions are, on the average, most likely not to be efficient, an issue that should be of concern to managers of credit unions. Income diversification activities, HHI (COMB) , in non-loan activities significantly associate with CE, and increase the inefficiency of credit unions, 
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Technical efficiency a conclusion similar to Worthington (2000) . Thus, credit unions aiming at reducing cost must be wary of non-loan income activities.
Increasing management expense, NIETA implies that CE level in credit union would decline, a relation that is very significant in Table V . The loan business of the credit union captured by LOTA reveals a negative coefficient, implying that high levels loans granted can cause inefficiencies; in Model 1, a 1 percent increase in loans would result in a 0.0014 decrease in CE. In Models 2 and 3, a 1 percent increase in loans would imply a 0.0015 reduction in CE. An increase in Age of the credit union suggests an improvement in CE as Esho (2001) and Wijesiri et al. (2015) also observed. This may be attributable to experience and learning curve effect as the credit union would not want to repeat decisions that might have led to inefficiency in the past. Liquidity implies improved CE for credit unions in all three models.
In Model 2, all the relationships afore-mentioned still hold with the same level of significance. As the banking sector's cost to total asset increases, credit unions stand to become cost efficient. This can be as a result of the direct competition that exists between credit unions and banks. Additionally, the temptation to win the same customer would mean each competitor would end up spending much more, hence this nature of relationship while top 5 bank size concentration is insignificant. All banking sector development indicators have negative coefficients to credit union cost efficiencies. From this, it is obvious that the banking sector matters in credit union efficiency as also found in Battaglia et al. (2010) . This can be attributable to the competition that exists between these two competing financial institutions in the financial market.
On the economy wide level, there exists a negative, insignificant relation between CE of credit unions and real return one-year Treasury bill rate. A growing economy can lead to improvement in CE for credit unions as indicated by the positive coefficient between GDPs. In Column 4 of Table VI, the insignificant coefficient of NWTA, HHI (COMB) and Age is when credit union fixed effect is accounted for as an explanatory variable in the model.
Technical efficiency measures management's ability to make use of resources and avoiding wastage as much as possible. In Table VII , size has positive and significant relations with technical efficiency comparable to Wijesiri et al.'s (2015) conclusions. Credit unions with higher new worth to asset are more technically efficient. The relationship between HHI (COMB) that is income diversification and technical efficiency is positive, i.e. an increase in credit unions' investment in non-loan income leads to an increase in technical efficiency. It must be explained that these non-loan investments need a lot of management commitment; less technically efficient credit unions may stick to loan business and make less adventure into non-loan activities. The more credit unions spend on non-interest expense, NIETA, the less technically efficient that credit union.
Loan to asset of credit unions shows an inverse relation with technical efficiency. Inherent is the loan business is bad loans, increasing loans comes with commensurate bad loans, loan increase implies a decrease in technical efficiency in all case. Increasing bad loans leads to higher levels of inefficiencies on the part of management of the credit union. The Age of the credit union has the same nature of relationship as in the case of CE. The more stable the banking sector, as measure by the BKZS, the less technically efficient the credit unions become, probably because labor may then move to banks, denying the credit union of quality management. An increase in the banking sector's efficiency implies a decline in technical efficiency of credit unions. Top 5 bank concentration, real Treasury bill and GDP growth do not significantly influence technical efficiency in the credit union. When credit union fixed effect is accounted for in the model as an explanatory variable in Column 4 of Table VII, the coefficient of SIZE, NWTA, HHI (COMB) , NIETA and AGE becomes insignificant while BDLN becomes significant.
We again use a two-limit Tobit regression to evaluate Equation (7). The range CE scores are scaled from 0.1078 to 1.000 and for technical efficiency, scaled from 0.1102 to 1.000 for both lower limit and upper limit, respectively. In these results, we see that if credit unions increase their size by 1 percent, the expected size effect would increase 0.056 and 0.002 on cost and technical efficiency, respectively, while holding all other variables in the model constant. For every 1 percent increase in NWTA, there exists 0.0029 increase in CE and 0.0061 decline in NWTA in the technical efficiency. Increase loan loss would lead to a decrease in the expected bad loan value by 0.0047 in CE.
The expected value of non-loan income diversification activities declines by 0.0977 in the CE model, and 0.2645 increase in the technical efficiency for every 1 percent increase in HHI (COMB) ; these relations are significant. There exists a decrease of 0.0108 for every increase in NIETA in relation to CE. The loan business exhibits a reduction as expected both in the CE and technical efficiency estimation. A 1 percent increase in loan to asset leads to a 0.0016 and 0.0022 decline in expected values of loan to asset. An increase in Age by one year implies an increase in value as given in the coefficient under both cost and technical efficiency. Liquidity captured by LITA shows an increase in expected value of 0.1494 under CE and 0.2052 under technical efficiency, on the average, from a 1 percent increase in LITA. The stability of the banking sector shows a decline of 0.0701 and 0.1036 decline in expected values for a unit increase in the case of the two dependent variables, respectively, in Table VIII . The efficiency level of the banking sector implies negative relations with CE and technical efficiency, a 1 percent increase in banking sector overhead cost leads to an increase of 0.0099 and 0.0014 in expected value. The real Treasury bill rate and GDP growth are not statistically significant. With the addition credit union fixed effect in the model in Table VIII , there was no change in the significance of coefficient under the CE model; however, in the fixed effect technical efficiency (FSTE), SIZE, NWTA, HHI (COMB) , NIETA, AGE become insignificant while BDLN is significant.
Conclusion
The current study estimates cost and technical efficiency for credit unions for Ghanaian credit unions during the period 2008-2014. Credit unions operated at CE average of 38.9 percent, while technical efficiency averaged 54.4 percent for the period. The results show that many 
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Technical efficiency credit unions are on the average technically efficient. We also realized that CE does not necessary translate into technical efficiency as there exist varying scores and positions for the same credit union among the sample credit unions. From the mixed effect and the two-limit Tobit regression estimates, the efficiency of the credit union is driven by factors like size, net worth to asset, bad loans, non-loan income, non-interest expense, loan to asset, liquidity and Age. Credit union efficiency is also significantly associated with competition and efficiency of the banking sector, with the wider economy bearing no statistical significant relations. From the evidence in this study, managers must aim at deploying every resource fully to avoid waste in their efforts to create value for the owners. Managers of credit unions must improve their production aspects of operations to cut down production cost. Pursuing technical efficiency should lead CE in the credit union setting. A monopolized banking sector and an inefficient banking sector do not challenge efficiency improvement in the credit unions industry. It is therefore appropriate for credit union managers to monitor the banking industry and craft strategies that would help improve their efficiency. It is recommended that policy makers for the financial institutions industry also look beyond the banking sector and consider the effect of their actions on smaller deposit taking financial institution like the credit union, since from this study we see that there exist rippling effects of banking sector activities on credit unions. 
